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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
Democratisation is an ongoing process, with elections being vital and regular events.1 In Africa, 
elections, as tools of democratisation have become common phenomenon with the wave of 
democratisation that hit the continent in the early 1990s.2 In particular, the move from single party 
and authoritarian system to a competitive multi-party system realized through elections has 
become the order of the day.3 However, the elections served to legitimise incumbent regimes, 
heralding the relapse of authoritarianism;4 characterised by patrimonialistic and clientelistic 
regimes which are void of accountability, thus eroding the qualities of democracy.5  
 
Freeness and fairness in elections are essential elements of constitutional democracy and must be 
administered according to each country’s constitution and well defined electoral laws.6 However, 
literature reveals that most elections have been replete with controversy, intimidations, and 
violence thus putting in question multiparty democracies in contemporary Africa.7 Generally, the 
frequent collapse of democracy in Africa has created a continent that is less stable, economically 
crippled, and incapable of resolving conflicts in a peaceful manner.8  
 
The right to participation under international law asserts that citizens are the ultimate repository of 
the sovereignty.9 Thus, the true depiction of the will of the people can be reflected if only the 
requirements of free and fair elections are fulfilled.10 Presently, given the fact that the number of 
electoral democracies are increasing, ensuring free and fair elections is the issue at stake. 
 
 
                                                 
1 R Austin ‘Democracy and Democratisation’ in W Maley, C Sampford and R Thakur (eds) From civil Strife to Civil 
Society: Civil and Military Responsibilities in Disrupted States (2003) 180 189. 
2 S Adjeumobi ‘Elections in Africa: A Fading Shadow or Democracy’ (2000) 21:1 International Political Science Review 
59 64.  
3 N Van De Walle ‘Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa’s Emerging Party systems’ (2003) 41:2 Journal of Modern 
African Studies’ 297 298.See also Staffan I Lindberg ‘The Power of Elections Revisited conference paper in the theme 
Elections and Political identities in New Democracies’ Yale University (2007) 2 <http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/new 
democracies/lindberg.pdf> (accessed 16 August 2007). 
4D Nohlen M Krennerich and B Thibaut Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook (1999) 12. See also Adjeumobi (n 2 above) 
66. 
5S I Lindberg ‘The Democratic Qualities of Competitive Elections: Participation, Competition and Legitimacy in Africa’ 
(2004) 41:1 Commonwealth Journal 61 65. See also Van de Walle (n 3 above) 299. 
6 M Ndulo ‘The Democratic State in Africa: The Challenges For Institution Building’ (1998) 16:1 National Black Law 
Journal 70 79. 
7 G Geisler  ‘Fair? What Has Fairness Got to Do With It? Vagaries of Election Observations and Democratic Standards’ 
(1993) 31:4 Journal of Modern African Studies 613 613. 
8 O Oko ‘Consolidating Democracy on a Troubled Continent: A Challenge for Lawyers in Africa’ (2000) 33 Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law 573 578. 
9 G Fox ‘The Right to Participation in International Law’ in G Fox and B R Roth (eds) Democratic Governance and 
International Law (2000) 50.  
10N Steytler, J Murphy, P de Vos and M Rewlamira Free and Fair Elections (1994) XXI.  
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1.2. Free and Fair Elections as the Foundations of the Democratic Process 
 
Sandbrook defines liberal democracy as: 
 
a political system characterised by regular and free elections in which politicians organised into 
parties compete to form the government, by right of virtually all adult citizens to vote and by 
guarantee of a range of  familiar political and civil rights.11 
 
This and other discourses on democracy position elections as a core element of liberal 
democracy.12 Dahl’s theory of polyarchy emphasises three aspects of democracy: organized 
contestation through regular, free, and fair elections; universal suffrage, and civil liberties.13 Hence, 
the issue of elections comes out as only one, but very visible aspect of democracy in conferring 
legitimacy to political regimes. 
 
Scholars, like Dahl, agree that elections by themselves are not an end in the democratisation 
process but certainly an essential one.14 Cowen and Laakso also assert that they provide a means 
of pre-empting the prospect of a violent change through a revolution or coup d’etat.15 
 
Democratic transition is among others measured by two crucial indicators namely; “freeness” and 
“fairness”. Though the phrase “free and fair” is foundational to democracy, no single and universal 
formula exists to define the terms and use them as evaluation standards.16 Carothers maintained 
that the absence of a single standard as well as the complexity of electoral process render any 
attempt to come up with a simple formula unrealistic.17   
 
It is argued that free and fair elections are the culmination of the democratisation process and not 
the beginning, and hence other prerequisites for democracy should be fulfilled including the 
entrenchment of fundamental rights and freedoms.18  
 
1.2.1. Freeness  
 
Freedom, according to Dahl, contrasts with coercion.19 Steytler et al noted that, a free election 
refers to ‘…the ability of people to associate in political parties and to propagate policies of their 
                                                 
11 (n 2 above) 60. 
12 As above. 
13 H J Wiarda ‘Democracy and Democratisation-Product of Western Tradition or Universal Phenomenon’ in H J Wiarda 
Comparative Democracy and Democratisation (2002) 7. 
14J Elklitt and P Svensson ‘What Makes Elections Free and Fair’ (1997) 8:3 Journal of Democracy 32 34. 
15 M Cowen and L Laakso ‘An Overview of Election Studies in Africa’ (1997) 35:4 Journal of Modern African Studies 717 
718. 
16 Elklitt and Svensson (n 14 above) 37. 
17 T Carothers ‘The Observers Observed’ (1997) 8:3 Journal of Democracy 17 24. 
18D Nupen Defining ‘Free and Fair Elections - the Jury is Out’ <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pubs/umrabulo/ 
umrabulo14/electiona.html> (accessed 2 September 2007) 4.  
19 Nupen (as above, 2). 
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choice without the interference from the state or any other party or individual.’20 It also refers to the 
rights of the voters to express their choice of a party or a candidate freely.21  
 
The assessment of the freeness of elections necessitates the fulfilment of the minimum 
requirements to include the realization of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of 
association, freedom from fear in connection with elections, equal and universal suffrage at the 
pre-election stage.22  
 
Notwithstanding the possibilities of limitations of the freedoms within the bounds of permissible 
infringement, polling day should be preceded by repeal of repressive legislation.23 Here, the rights 
to hold marches, meetings, rallies are envisaged within the rubric of freedom of speech.24 Polling 
day should be characterised by the opportunity to participate in the election and the absence of 
intimidation of voters.25 At last, post-election periods should allow for possibilities of complaint 
mechanism as well as adequate means for resolution of election related conflicts.26  
 
1.2.2. Fairness 
Elkilitt and Svensson argue that fairness of elections implies impartiality characterised by unbiased 
application of rules, and reasonableness in terms of access to resources amongst competitors.27 In 
essence, it is an attempt to ensure the equality between parties in election processes. Fairness 
can be manifested at the different stages of election. According to Nupen, pre-election period 
should be characterised by: 
a transparent electoral process, impartial voter education programmes, an election Act and a system 
for seat allocation which grants no special privileges to any party, group or person, an independent and 
impartial electoral commission, absence of impediments to inclusion in the electoral register, adequate 
provisions for checking the provisional electoral register, an orderly election campaign, equal access to 
public mass media and absence of the misuse of government facilities for campaign purposes.28 
On the other hand, polling day should ensure the-  
Secrecy of the ballot and avoidance of double voting, well designed ballot paper without serial 
numbers, the proper treatment of void ballot papers, access to the polling stations for accredited party 
representatives and election observers, and impartial assistance to incapacitated voters.29 
Lastly, the assessment of elections as “fair” would see, among other things: 
[t]he Proper counting, transportation of election materials, ensuring security of polling stations, 
impartial reports of election results by the media, impartial treatment of election complaints and 
acceptance of election results by all involved.30 
                                                 
20 Steytler et al. (n 10 above) XXI.  
21 As above. 
22 Nupen (n 18 above) 17. 
23 Steytler et al. (n 20 above). 
24 As above. 
25 Nupen (n 18 above). 
26 As above. 
27 Elkilitt and Svensson (n 16 above) 37. 
28 Nupen (n 18 above) 5. 
29 Nupen (as above). 
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The state is in a better position to ensure fair elections to all competing parties.31 While ideally 
there no such a thing as an entirely clean election, the essence of “freeness and fairness” allow for 
the identification of democratically acceptable and non-acceptable processes.32 According to 
Lindberg, there is a slightly upward trend in the share of elections that have been free and fair on 
the continent.33  
Recent trend in elections in Africa exhibit traits that severely undermine the freeness as well as 
fairness jeopardizing the civil and political rights of people as well as the democratization project. In 
so doing, this paper assesses five key problems on the basis of recent elections held in Ethiopia 
(2005), Uganda (2006) and Nigeria (2007).34 However, it is not implied that previously held 
elections are free from any of the deficiencies identified in this research. 
Erstwhile commitments such as the AU constitutive Act emphasise respect for democratic 
principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance as the applicable principles of the 
African Union.35 In the same stance, it affirms the need to condemn and reject unconstitutional 
change of governments laying down the foundation for democratic transition of regimes.36 
Such efforts have crystallized into handful of commitments translating the mentioned principles. 
Among them is the recent adoption of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and 
Governance in January 2007.37 It is the assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
provisions in dealing with the electoral problems that form the essence of the present research. 
1.3. Research Question  
The paper addresses the question whether the Charter would effectively address the identified 
electoral problems at a substantive as well as implementation levels.  
1.4. Problem Statement and Aims of the study 
Despite the array of issues that undermine elections in Africa, this paper addresses key electoral 
problems that are evident in recent elections on the continent. In so doing, it explores the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
30 Nupen (as above). 
31 Steytler et al. (n 20 above). 
32 Van de Walle (n 3 above) 61. 
33 (n 3 above) 15. See also S I Lindberg Democracy and Elections in Africa (2006) 71. 
34 The analysis is based on international observers reports, mainly that of the European Union (EU) observation mission. 
Effort is made to keep consistent use of sources. 
35 Constitutive Act of the African Union OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/23.15, entered into force May 26, 2001 
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/auconst-act2001.html> Article 3(m). 
36 Article 3(p).  
37The Charter was adopted at the eighth Ordinary Session of the Assembly and comes to enforcement 30 days after the 
15th ratification. So far, only ten countries signed namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Rwanda, Nigeria, Congo, 
Djibouti, Mali, Namibia <http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/ Treaties/treaties.htm> (accessed 20 August 
2007). 
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effectiveness or otherwise of the new Charter as a tool in addressing the listed key problems 
bedevilling elections in Africa. 
 
Accordingly, the aim of the study is two fold. This paper analyses the key electoral problems in 
Africa by analysing trends in recent elections that jeopardise democratic consolidation. Secondly, it 
evaluates the Charter in addressing the identified problems at normative as well as practical levels. 
It will be argued that the substantive provisions of the Charter are not able to fully address the 
issues as the commitment of states falls short of expectations in relation to the key electoral 
problems making the document deficient; hence making the Charter idealistic and incapable of 
solving the subtle and calculated manipulations occurring in the region. On the other hand, it would 
also establish the undeniable ideals that will be promoted by having such a value laden instrument.   
 
It will also be argued that there is a lacuna in the implementation mechanism of the Charter. Given 
the absence of a complaint or robust reporting mechanisms, it leaves compliance to states’ 
discretion. To this end, it will be argued that the full commitment and political will of the states in 
Africa remains to be, at best, a panacea to address the problems and ensure the implementation of 
the Charter.      
 
1.5. Significance of the study 
 
This paper gives an insight into the novelties as well as the deficiencies of the provisions related to 
democratic elections and their implementation framework. It examines the potential effectiveness 
or otherwise of a binding treaty which is not yet enforced on the basis of past experience. In effect, 
it sheds light on the possible measures that could be taken to guarantee its realisation and to 
circumvent the shortcomings in ensuring its effective implementation. 
 
In the course of the description of the arguments, the paper would also expose the possible 
challenges that may come across the implementation of the provisions of the Charter. This will help 
to identify the problems as well as the solutions to remedy them. 
 
1.6. Methodology 
 
This research is desk based whereby a review of published as well as unpublished materials such 
as books, journal articles, research papers, reports, internet sources is made. Primary sources to 
include regional instruments would also be analysed.   
 
1.7. Limitations 
 
Although much literature exists exposing the nature of electoral democracies in the continent, 
owing to the newness of the Charter, an in depth study exposing electoral problems on the 
continent in light of the charter is lacking. This would in turn impact on this research as the present 
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analysis is the projection of the fate of the Charter on the basis of past trends and may not give an 
accurate picture of the future scenario.  
 
It would not exhaustively deal with the issues due to its limited scope. However, it is believed that it 
will contribute something to an extent it attempts to address the aforementioned problems.   
 
1.8. Literature Review  
 
Most works in relation to the issue at hand focus on the discourse of the wider notion of democracy 
in general and specifically in Africa. Hence, it inevitably reduced the analysis of elections as a 
means to democratisation and the controversies surrounding them. Literature dealing with African 
elections addresses specific issues making broader analysis difficult.  
 
The researcher is able to find literature that may closely be used for the present work such as the 
AfriMap sponsored article on the salient features of the Charter in comparison with the Protocol on 
Democracy and Good Governance (the ECOWAS Protocol).38 Its scope is limited to the 
comparison of the normative framework of the two instruments by highlighting some of the gaps 
and the strengths of the new Charter in light of the ECOWAS Protocol. Other AfriMap sponsored 
articles have attempted to provide a highlight of the features of the Charter in relation to selected 
issues.39 For the purposes of the intended work, these articles can be informative but by no means 
exhaustive of the issues. As the Charter is new, this paper will be able to present a new dimension 
of the issues in the objective context of the continent and the possible recommendations thereto.  
 
1.9. Overview of Chapters 
 
The paper comprises five chapters. Chapter one outlines the rationale for the research and the 
manner in which the study is conducted. In so doing, it gives a brief background of the study by 
highlighting the reality at hand in relation to the election trends in Africa. It also presents the 
research questions and the hypothesis to be argued about. 
 
Chapter Two discusses the salient problems of recent elections in Africa and provides a broad 
exposition of case examples cited from the elections in Ethiopia, Uganda and Nigeria.  
 
                                                 
38 S T Ebobrah ‘The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance: A New Dawn for the Enthronement of 
Legitimate Governance in Africa?’ Open Society Institute, African Governance Monitoring and Advocacy Project 
(AfriMAP) http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/paper/ACDEG&ECOWASEbobrah. pdf (2007) (accessed 15 May  
2007). 
39 N F Ngarhodjim ‘African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance: A Critical Analysis’ (2007) 
<http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/paper/ACDEG Ngarhodjim_EN.pdf> (accessed 2 August 2007) ; 
S Saungweme ‘A Critical Look at the Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance’ (2007)  
<http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/paper/ACDEG Saungweme.pdf> (accessed 2 August 2007) ; E R McMahon 
‘African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance : A Positive Step on a Long Path’ (2007) 
<http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/paper/ ACDEG&IADCMcMahon.pdf> (accessed  22 July 2007). 
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Chapter Three deals with evaluation of pre-existing commitments in dealing with the identified 
problems at regional as well as sub-regional levels.  
 
Chapter Four exposes the legislative background and the justifications for the adoption of the 
Charter and assesses the substantive as well the enforcement provisions of the Charter in 
addressing the key electoral problems identified.  
 
Finally, Chapter Five culminates in conclusions and the possible recommendations that will ensure 
the effective implementation of the Charter and the promotion of democratic elections on the 
continent. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Salient Problems of Recent Elections in Africa 
 
 2.1. Background of the Elections 
The paper briefly analyzes three elections that took place on the continent with the view to 
answering the research question. Accordingly, the recent elections held in Ethiopia, Uganda and 
Nigeria give a good picture of the trends in the electoral politics of Africa. Moreover, these 
countries play an important role in African politics in different ways with the influential leaders in 
power. Most importantly, however, the electoral trend in these countries shows that repeated 
elections are being used to legitimise the continuation in power of incumbent regimes. The key 
problems exhibited in the elections need to be addressed if democratic transition is to succeed in 
Africa.   
2.2. The Ethiopian Elections 
Beginning on 15 May 2005, Ethiopia conducted the third national parliamentary election. It was the 
first genuinely competitive multi-party elections and by comparison with previous elections, it was 
characterized by greater political inclusiveness.40 In fact, the assertion such as the one made by 
Abbink that ’…the elections were among the best organised in Africa’ would not amount to an 
exaggeration.41 From the high voter turn out, it was clear that many people wanted a change, 
sometimes even without knowing much about what the opposition parties would bring.42 
 
The elections were generally held in a peaceful and orderly manner, with the exception of some 
isolated incidents.43 However, the results that affirmed the incumbency of the ruling regime, the 
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), 44 had its majority in parliament 
dropped opening a space for two main opposition coalitions and a range of independent 
candidates.45 
 
However, observers’ reports show that elections and post-election periods were characterised by a 
number of shortcomings such as vote riggings, human rights violations, unfair use of the media, 
                                                 
40 EU Election Observation Mission in Ethiopia, Preliminary Statement, 17 May 2005 <http://ec.europa.eu/ 
external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_ass_observ/ethiopia/pre_stat_17-05-05.pdf> (accessed 20 August 2007) 1. 
41 J Abbink ‘Interpreting Ethiopian Elections in Their Context- A Reply to Tobias Hagmann’ (2006) 105:421 African Affairs 
613 615. 
42 E Pettersen and E Salvesen ‘Ethiopia: Parliamentary Election May 2005’ The Norwegian Centre for Human 
Rights/NORDEM (2006) <http://www.humanrights.uio.no/forskning/publ/nr/2006/0906.pdf> (accessed 1 September 
2007)16. 
43 As above,17. 
44 J W Harbeson ‘Ethiopia’s Extended Transition’ (2005) 16:4 Journal of Democracy 111 144. 
45 As above. 
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partial electoral commission and weak complaints mechanism. As a result, they fell short of the 
standards of free and fair elections. 
 
While the pre-elections period exhibited commendable atmosphere, credible allegations of voter 
intimidation and violence were confirmed.46 Although minor procedural irregularities were observed 
in the capital city, Addis Ababa, allegations of multiple voting, underage voting, unsecured ballot 
boxes and barring of party agents at polling stations from watching ballot counts were evidenced in 
other parts of the country.47 In addition, evidence of vote inflation, unauthorized and early 
announcement of results both by the ruling regime as well as the main oppositions,48 delays in 
counting and  incompetent electoral officials who could have contributed to the mishaps mentioned 
above were also observed.49  
 
New restrictions were introduced into the overall legal framework through an amendment of the 
Penal Code on matters affecting the media and the directive issued by the National Electoral Board 
of Ethiopia ( NEBE) barring most NGOs from observing elections came out only few weeks prior to 
the elections.50 Even if the Federal High Court reversed the decision of the Board, the limited 
amount of time left for preparation could not permit effective mission on the part of civil 
society.51.Adjeumobi describes the above as a ‘deleterious manipulation of elections in the form of 
subversion of electoral rules and regulations.’52 
 
Though the NEBE’s increased transparency and responsiveness is an improvement over previous 
elections,53 its response during complaints processes revealed partiality and partisanship.54 
Institutions such as, police and the armed militia were openly partisan, for example by wearing 
EPRDF symbols and instructing citizens to attend an EPRDF rally.55 In the former case, observers 
witnessed police distributing anti-CUD (opposition) banners and chasing children and youngsters 
supporting the opposition coalitions.56 The pre-election period saw state institutions and state 
assets (i.e. cars, buildings) being used by the ruling EPRDF in the election campaigning.57  
 
Although prior to the elections the media which state dominated had generally provided a balanced 
coverage allowing genuine democratic discussions between political parties,58 the last week of 
campaigns witnessed a biased tone of coverage in favour of the ruling party especially by the state 
                                                 
46 Carter Centre ‘Final Statement on the Carter Centre Observation of the Ethiopia 2005 National Elections,, September 
2005’ <http://www.cartercenter.com/documents/2199.pdf>(accessed 20 August 2007) 4. 
47 As above. 
48 EU Election Observation Mission ‘Ethiopia Legislative Elections 2005 Report’ <http://ec.europa.eu/external 
_relations/human_rights/eu_election_ass_observ/ethiopia/pre_stat_17-05-05.pdf> (accessed 20 August 2007) 21. 
49 As above, 19. 
50 (n 48 above) 2. 
51 As above. 
52 (n 2 above ) 67. 
53 (n 48 above) 10. 
54 As above 14. See also Carter Centre (n 46 above) 10. 
55 EU report (n 48 above) 16. 
56 As above. 
57 EU preliminary statement (n 40 above) 5. See also the final report (n 53 above) 16. 
58 EU report  (n 48 above) 17. 
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owned media.59 After the elections, there was a drastic reversal of state media policy whereby 
opposition parties no longer had access to state-owned media.60 EPRDF victory statement, 
selective publication of observers’ statements through the only media characterised the situation.61  
 
The pre-elections period was marked by instances of violence and intimidation of opposition 
members during the campaign creating a climate in which candidates felt constrained to campaign 
and voters to choose without fear of repercussions contrary to the Constitutional guarantees of 
freedom of expressions and assembly.62  
 
The period following the elections was marked by highly charged political tensions, several days of 
protests and electoral violence, delays in vote tabulation, a large number of electoral complaints, 
and a prolonged and problematic electoral dispute resolution process.63 This led to the 
deterioration of the human rights situation, among other things, through the banning of freedom of 
assembly in the capital, the refusal by the state to publish opposition statements on the electoral 
process.64  
. 
These developments were accompanied by arbitrary detentions, beatings and killings of the 
members of the opposition parties, ethnic minorities, NGO workers and members of the press by 
government forces.65 The arrest of 111 people, including opposition leaders, human right 
defenders and journalists on charges of treason and genocide was later dropped for lesser 
charges by the Federal High Court.66  
 
The detention of opposition leaders who won the elections prevented them from assuming power. 
As Shedler asserts, ‘like elections that begin without a choice, elections that end without 
consequences are undemocratic’.67 Winners must be able to assume office, exercise power and 
conclude their terms in accordance with constitutional rules to ensure democratic transitions.68.  
 
In addition, despite the establishment of the Complaints Investigation Panels (CIP) by the Electoral 
Board, the system failed to provide remedy to contestants given the fact that the human rights 
context in the country was characterised by the repression of the opposition.69 The setting up of the 
complaints mechanism has undermined the ability of opposition to participate on an equal field. 70  
                                                 
59 As above 18. 
60 Carter Centre (n 46 above) 5.  
61 EU report ( n 48 above) 18. 
62 Carter Centre (n 46 above) 2. 
63 As above. 
64 EU report (n 48 above) 2. There were arrests of students and citizens on strike and the killing of 37 people, according 
to an official report, with hundreds injured. 
65 Amnesty International ‘Ethiopia: The 15 May 2005 Elections and Human Rights - Recommendations to the 
Government, Election observers and Political Parties (2006) <http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR 
250022005>(accessed 20 August 2007) 116. 
66 E Blunt ‘What Next for Ethiopia’s Freed Leaders?’ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6236990.stm> (accessed 8 
September 2007).  
67 A Shedler ‘Elections without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation’ (2002) 13:2 Journal of Democracy 36 39.  
68 As above. 
69 EU report (n 48 above) 3. 
70 As above. 
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Observers’ reports revealed that there were inconsistencies in the application of rules for the 
admission of evidence and witnesses, reports of intimidation of witnesses, apparent partisanship 
on the part of NEBE presiding officers.71 Moreover, intentional delays on the part of opposition 
parties, withdrawals from the process by the opposition parties resulting in decisions being taken in 
their absence led to the fall of general confidence in the election process.72 To add to the problem, 
while appeal against the decisions of the Electoral Board from the different panels was available, 
the fact that the judiciary was run by the chairman of the board itself put in question the 
effectiveness of the mechanism.73  
 
2.3. The Ugandan Elections   
 
The February 2006 presidential and parliamentary elections in Uganda heralded the transition from 
single party system to a multi-party system and hence have become a very important milestone in 
the democratisation process.74 These elections were also said to have provided an opportunity for 
a wide range of democratic institutions to be tested.75 It was also a testing case whether multiparty 
elections could found a legitimate change of government.76 
 
The decision to adhere to multipartyism was followed by the lifting of the presidential term limit 
through constitutional amendment.77 The delay in the enactment of the legislation permitting 
political activity by opposition until few months before the elections contradicted the commitment to 
promote inclusiveness hindering sufficient preparation by the opposition.78 However, some 
opposition parties and importantly the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) have managed to 
remain in the elections despite the impediments.79 As a result, international observation missions 
affirmed that the elections fell short of full compliance with international principles for genuine 
democratic elections.80 The results affirmed the victory of the ruling regime, the National 
Resistance Movement (NRM) though with less votes than the previous elections.81  
What Shedler calls ‘candidate screening’82 occurred to the leader of the strongest opposition party, 
the FDC, Dr. Kizza Besigye upon his arrest on charges of treason and tramped up charges of rape 
                                                 
71 Carter Centre (n 46 above) 7. 
72 As above. 
73 As above. 
74 European Union ‘Uganda Presidential and Parliamentary Elections 23 February 2006: European Union Election 
Observation Mission Final Report’ <http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/humanrights/euelectionassobserv/uganda/ 
final.pdf>(accessed 5 September 2007) 2. 
75 As above. 
76 As above, 5. 
77 EU report (n 74 above) 5. 
78 As above. 
79 As above. 
80CNN ‘Ugandan President Wins Election’ (2001) <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/africa/03/13/ uganda.election/> 
(accessed 2 September 2007). 
81 As above. 
82 Shedler (n 67above) 42. 
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few months prior to the elections.83 However, the Supreme Court ruled that, while not affecting the 
results of the presidential election in a substantial manner, there existed non-compliance with 
electoral laws, through the disenfranchisement of voters and in counting and tallying of results.84 It 
also affirmed the existence of bribery, intimidation, violence, and violation of the principles of equal 
suffrage, transparency of the vote, and secrecy of the ballot through multiple voting and ballot box 
stuffing in some areas.85  
Although the Electoral Commission managed to maintain significant level of public confidence, 
especially in the manner it rejected the last minute claims made to it seeking Dr. Besigye’s 
disqualification as a candidate,86 this was eroded following petitions of electoral flaws made by all 
political parties.87 Despite the applauded attitude of the judiciary in maintaining its independence, 
the Constitutional Court’s endorsement of the jurisdiction of the military court over civilians violated 
the principles of human rights established under international and Ugandan laws.88  
 
Both the police and the army (Ugandan Peoples Democratic Force) UPDF were evidently partial in 
favour of the ruling party despite the Code of Conduct adopted for Security Personnel during the 
election process.89 Observers also witnessed intimidation and assault of opposition supporters and 
independent candidates by security forces.90  
 
The NRM utilised state resources in support of campaigns including cars, personnel and 
advertising, and received overwhelming and positive coverage on state television and radio.91 On 
the contrary, the media coverage given to opposition and in particular, the FDC and the candidate 
Dr. Besigye was devoted to the various legal cases concerning him before the courts instead of his 
campaign agenda.92 Moreover, the state media was biased towards Mr. Museveni and the NRM.93 
 
Despite some improvements over the previous years, notable shortcomings were observed, in the 
Electoral Commission, including extensive problems in validating the voter registration resulting in 
the disenfranchisement of voters on election day, deficient training of polling staff, and problems 
with the delivery of election materials in some areas.94  
 
 
 
                                                 
83EU report (n 74 above) 
84 As above. 
85 As above. 
86 As above. 
87 EU report (n 74 above) 1. 
88 Human Rights Watch News ‘Uganda: Government Threat to Free Elections Harassment of Opposition in Presidential, 
Parliamentary Poll’ (2006) <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/14/02/Ugan15887. htm> (accessed 20 May 2007). 
89 As above. 
90 As above. 
91 EU report (n 74 above) 1. 
92 As above 2. 
93 As above. 
94 As above, 1. 
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2.3. The Nigerian Elections  
The most recent and the third consecutive presidential elections took place in Nigeria on April 2007 
when for the first time one elected leader succeeded another.95 Being Africa's most populated 
country, it is plagued by inter-ethnic, religious conflicts not to mention the political tension that has 
escalated in the petroleum-rich Niger Delta.96 
 
Observer’s report stated that the political arena on the pre-election period was fraught with 
activities such as systematic exclusion of opposition members with the Independent Electoral 
Commission (INEC) being complicit to government agenda.97 The internal wrangling among the 
major political parties and the unsuccessful constitutional reform proposals made to prolong 
President Olusegun Obasanjo’s third term in office also corroborate this assertion.98 
 
The elections were brazenly rigged and almost all observers affirmed that they were far from 
fulfilling the international standard of free and fair elections.99 The existence in some areas of ballot 
papers outside of the ballot boxes, the absence of  secret voting booths,100 blatant riggings in some 
Locals Government Areas (LGAs) or their deliberate omission from being a polling area have been 
witnessed.101 
 
National Observers, when not either complicit with electoral fraud, or coerced into cooperation with 
local riggers, were often intimidated by party or Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) 
agents.102  In some areas, results have been pre-determined or nullified because they were 
unpredictable and/or unfavourable to the ruling party.103  
 
The unanimous statements of observers showed that the flawed elections facilitated the dynastic 
succession of the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) candidate, Umaru Musa Yar'Adua,104 
under the guise of multi-party elections, once again confirming the authoritarian traits of the regime 
establishing single party dominance. 
 
Pre-election observations have indicated the failure of the national Assembly to review the 
Constitution to give real autonomy to the Electoral Commission.105 The Commission’s decision to 
disqualify the major competitor, Vice President Atiku Abubakar, led to the accusation of the 
                                                 
95 United States Institute of Peace ‘Nigeria’s 2007 Elections: The Fitful Path to Democratic Citizenship’ Special Report 
182, (2007) <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr182.pdf>(accessed 2 September 2007) 1. 
96 As above. 
97 IDASA ‘Report On IDASA’s Observation Mission in Nigeria’ <www.idasa.org> (accessed 20 August 2007) 3. 
98As above. 
99 IDASA (n 97 above) 1.See also International Crisis Group ‘Nigeria’s Elections: Avoiding a Political Crisis’ Crisis Group 
Africa Report N°123, 28 March 2007 <www.crisisgroup.org> (accessed 20 August 2007) 1. 
100 (n 95 above) 6. 
101 IDASA report (n 97 above) 8. 
102 As above 10. 
103 As above. 
104 As above 3. 
105 (n 95 above) 1. 
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Commission’s partisanship.106 Its inefficiency in the electoral administration led to the non-
transparent and non-reliable process and the results obtained.107  
 
Exclusionary measures targeting the opposition parties have also been taken.108Accordingly, the 
major competitor to the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, Vice 
President Attiku Abubakar, escaped disqualification through the Supreme Court’s ruling that 
overturned the INEC’s decision to have gotten him on the ballot only few days before the 
elections.109 This impacted on his campaign effectiveness and his ability to build-up enough 
support for his candidacy.110  
 
In addition, voter intimidation by political parties as well as the Commission took place.111 Parties 
themselves were under the constant intimidation of INEC or stronger party agents.112 Human 
Rights Watch reported that it was an exceptionally violent election resulting 300 election related 
deaths showing the inability of the government to protect fundamental rights of the people.113 
 
The elections have exhibited the most haphazard and dismal record in terms of setting up 
mechanisms to rectify election related problems in the country. Accordingly, it was reported that 
‘…there was no mechanism in place for troubleshooting or correcting problems or discrepancies at 
polling units, local government offices or INEC offices.’114 Also, polling officials had little or no 
support on the ground, sometimes turning to police or party agents for assistance out of 
necessity.115  
2.4. Some conclusions  
The above discussion highlights five key problems common in elections held in the three countries. 
These include manipulation of electoral processes and results; lack of impartial electoral bodies 
and democratic institutions; government’s use of state resources and the media in electoral 
campaigns; repression of basic human rights and civic engagements; as well as impartial and 
insufficient complaints and dispute resolution mechanisms. 
As Shedler correctly argues, ’democratic elections are mechanisms of social choice under 
conditions of freedom and equality.’116 Thus, to qualify as democratic, elections should offer an 
effective choice of political authorities, allowing citizens to formulate their preferences to be 
                                                 
106 IDASA report (n 97 above) 3. 
107 As above 10. 
108 As above 9. 
109 As above 3. 
110 As above. 
111 IDASA (n 97 above) 10. 
112 As above. 
113 C Albin-Lackey and B Rawlence ‘What's next for Nigeria? The whole Concept of African Democracy is at Risk’ 
Human Rights Watch <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/05/09/nigeri15887.htm> (accessed 20 May 2007). 
114 As above. 
115 As above. 
116 Shedler  (n 67 above) 38. 
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governed by their own choice.117 However, even if pre-electoral conditions allow for free and fair 
competition, the will of the people may be tramped by electoral fraud.118 While the introduction of 
multipartyism raised the hopes of the people, the elections posed what Ellis called ‘choice between 
oppressors.’119 The ‘politics of exclusion’ characterising the nature of states in Africa120 is 
manifested through multi-party elections. This is opening a lee way for the increasing number of 
electoral authoritarians in the continent. 
The importance of specific institutions such as police, the army and the judiciary have been heavily 
compromised making their role as engines of democracy very limited. This is compounded by the 
wanton misuse of the media by the incumbents. This has ultimately limited the role of political 
parties and civil society in the democratisation process. The absence of institutions with sufficient 
complaint mechanisms during and after elections, which, according to Cowen and Laakso, 
guarantee equal protection of political forces in the course of democratic competition characterised 
the elections.121 Thus, they confirm what Van de Walle refers to as the ‘routinisation of multiparty 
elections’ without genuine competitions.122  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
117 As above. 
118 As above. 
119 S Ellis ‘Elections in Africa in Historical Context’ in J Abbink and G Hesseling (eds) Election observation and 
Democratisation in Africa (2000)37 45. 
120 C Ake The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa (2000) 39. 
121 M Cowen and L Laakso  ‘An Overview of Election Studies in Africa’ (1997) 35:4 Journal of Modern African Studies 
717 735. 
122 Van de Walle (n 3 above) 298. 
 16
Chapter Three 
 
Appraisal of Pre-existing Commitments Addressing Electoral Problems in Africa 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
In order to assess the value of the Charter it is important to place it in the context of the 
instruments that have preceded it. This will indicate if and to what extent it has added value to the 
holding of free and fair elections. Hence, in this chapter, an assessment of the effectiveness or 
otherwise of pre-existing commitments dealing with free and fair elections will be made.123 
 
3.2. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981) 
 
The Charter’s adoption124 was built on the idea that the continent needs an “African Convention on 
Human Rights” to give full effect to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United 
Nations Charter.125 It aimed to provide a normative framework for the African regional human rights 
system.126 It stipulates, inter alia, freedom of conscience,127 rights to receive information,128 free 
association,129 free assembly,130 and to participate freely in the government of one’s country, either 
directly or indirectly through freely chosen representatives in accordance with the provisions of the 
law.131 
 
In particular, Article 13 of the Charter resonates the notion of freeness of elections though it does 
not give the content of what it signifies. Nor it stipulates the requirement of fairness as a distinct 
element but seems to merge the two to imply the requirement of the expression of the will of 
citizens in choosing their representatives. Hence, except in providing a general framework of rights 
by enjoining states to fulfil, promote, respect and protect such rights, the Charter fails to elaborate 
on the elements of democratic elections and their framework of implementation. As a result, the 
                                                 
123See the Preamble of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance as well as the Report of the 
meeting of Independent Experts on the Draft Charter in Democracy, Elections and Governance, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
21-23 November 2005, available at <http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/conferences/past/2006/april/pa/apr7/ 
meeting.htm> (accessed 18 September 2007) 6. Nearly all the endeavours discussed in this chapter are drawn from the 
preamble of the new Democracy Charter which aims to ‘enhance the relevant Declarations and Decisions of the 
OAU/AU.’ 
124 African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 
I.L.M. 58 (1982) entered into force Oct. 21, 1986 <http:// www1.umn.edu/humanrts/ instree/z1afchar.htm> (accessed 18 
September 2007). 
125Human Dimension program, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies in Cooperation with DiploFoundation ‘The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ <http://www.diplomacy.edu/african charter/default.asp> (accessed 18 
September 2007). 
126 F Viljoen and L Louw ‘The Status of the African Commission: From Moral Persuasion to Legal Obligation’ (2004) 48:1 
Journal of African Law 1 1.  See generally G Bekker ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Safeguarding the 
Interests of African States’ (2007) 51:1 Journal of African Law 151 152. 
127 Article 7.  
128 Article 8.  
129 Article 9. 
130 Article 10. 
131 Article 13(1). 
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need for specific set of rules that transform the rights into enforceable principles in a separate 
manner is implied. 
 
3.3. Algiers Declaration (1999) 
 
As a continuation of previous efforts meant to free the continent from the socio- cultural, economic 
and political problems, African Head of States adopted the Algiers Declaration.132 The rhetoric of 
democracy, good governance, and sustainable development emerged in this document reiterating 
inter alia,  
commitment to the protection and promotion of  human rights; increased space for freedom and the 
establishment of democratic institutions that are representative of our peoples and receiving their 
active participation,…..underpinned by the rule of law, respect for the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of the citizens and the democratic management of public affairs.133 
 
Such progress shows the increased acknowledgment of the indispensability of human rights and 
democratic principles in promoting development in the continent. Notwithstanding the Declaration’s 
status as a guide to states’ behaviour in upholding democratic qualities through, for instance, 
holding of free and fair elections, its failure to provide the requirements of freeness and fairness in 
ensuring democratic elections leaves glaring gaps.  
 
3.4. Lome Declaration Unconstitutional Change of Governments (2000) 
 
This document is a response to a coup d’etat that took place in Sierra Leone by denouncing the act 
as unacceptable in light of the principles of human rights established under the OAU Charter and 
the African Charter on Human and peoples’ Rights.134 There is an indication that further efforts 
such as the new Democracy Charter were deeply buttressed by this document in ensuring 
democratic transitions in Africa.135  
 
In effect, the Declaration aims to consolidate principles of democratic governance as set out in 
various Declarations and other documents of the OAU.136 Accordingly, it lists common principles 
that need be adhered to, such as, respect for rule of law and human rights, promotion of pluralism 
or participatory democracy and role of civil society.137 
 
                                                 
132 Adopted at the thirty-Fifth Ordinary Session of OAU/Third Ordinary Session of AEC 12-14 July 1999 AHG/Decl. 1-2 
(XXXV) Algiers, Algeria <http://www.africa-union.org/official_documents/Heads%20of%20 State%20 Summits/hog/ 
9HoGAssembly1999.pdf> (accessed 18 September 2007). 
133 As above 17. 
134 Declaration On the  Framework for An OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government(Lome 
Declaration) Adopted by Organization of African Unity, meeting at the Thirty-sixth Ordinary Session of our Assembly in 
Lomé, Togo from 10 – 12 July 2000 AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI) 2000 <http://www.ohchr.Org/English/law/compilation_ 
democracy/lomedec.htm> (accessed 18 September 2007) para. 3.  
135 This is implied from Paragraph 4 of the explanatory notes of the Experts and Ministerial meeting on the draft African 
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance <http://www.africaunion.org/root/au/ conferences/past/ 2006/april/pa/ 
apr7/meeting.htm> (accessed 20 May 2007).  
136 Para. 9. 
137 Para. 9 sub paras. i,ii,iii, iv, vii, viii, and ix. 
 18
Most importantly, it recognises the principle of democratic change and the role of the opposition as 
well as the organisation of free and regular elections in conformity with existing instruments.138 The 
effect of non-adherence to these principles, the obligations of the African Union as well as 
individual states in response to unconstitutional change of governments, the ensuing sanctions on 
perpetrators or states and the measures to be taken to restore constitutional order are dealt with.139 
However, in the words of Udombana, it is a ‘discreet moral pressure on the perpetrators of the 
unconstitutional change in facilitating restoration of constitutional order.’140 It neither resulted in the 
establishment of sanctions committee to monitor compliance.141  
 
3.5. The AU Constitutive Act (2001) 
 
The OAU transformed itself into African Union with renewed objectives among which consolidation 
of democratic institutions and culture, good governance and the rule of law form part.142 In addition, 
other objectives include the promotion of democratic principles and institutions, popular 
participation and good governance as well as human and peoples’ rights as recognized under 
international and regional instruments.143  It further condemns and rejects unconstitutional change 
of governments.144  
 
However, apart from laying the basis for democratic values which allow for the holding of free and 
fair elections, the Act falls short of addressing the electoral problems of the continent. 
Nevertheless, it provides significantly for the institutional avenue through which erstwhile as well as 
recent efforts to ensure free and fair elections would be realised.   
 
3.6. New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Declaration on Democracy, 
Political, Economic and Corporate Governance (2002) 
 
Like the predecessor instruments, the Declaration remains to be an expression of the common 
aspiration of African States. It envisages the achievement of sustainable development in Africa 
while it claims to be mindful of earlier commitments to ensure ‘stability, peace and security, 
promoting closer economic integration, ending unconstitutional changes of government, supporting 
human rights and upholding the rule of law and good governance.’145 
                                                 
138 Para. 9 sub-paras.v and vi. 
139 Paras. 12 and 13. 
140 N Udombana ‘Can the Leopard Change its Spots?: The African Union Treaty and Human Rights’ (2002) 17:6 
American University International Law Review. 1177 1197. 
141 As above. 
142See Preamble of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/23. 15 entered into force  May 26, 
2001  <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/auconst-act2001.html> (accessed 18 September 2007) 
143 Article 3(g) and (h) of the Constitutive Act. See also Article 4(m) of the Act which resonates similar values as a matter 
of principle. 
144 Article 4(p). 
145 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Thirty Eighth 
Ordinary Session of OAU, 8 July 2002, Durban, South Africa, NEPAD Doc. Declaration on Democracy, Political, 
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Democratic values such as free and fair elections have been recognized as an inalienable right of 
individuals, albeit at an abstract level.146 It also reiterates the need for free, fair and credible 
elections as a commitment to promote democracy as its core values.147 The commitment to 
‘strengthen and, where necessary, establish an appropriate electoral administration and oversight 
bodies and provide the necessary resources and capacity to conduct elections which are free, fair 
and credible’ is provided.148 The need for reassessing and strengthening sub-regional and AU 
monitoring mechanisms and procedures is also stated.149  
 
This Declaration is also a non-binding document which only puts moral and political pressure on 
member states. However, the partnership being an important avenue for the promotion of 
democratic values and peer assessment through the APRM,150 the Declaration will advance the 
principles of free and fair elections.  
 
3.7. ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001) 
 
This sub-regional document can be compared with that of the new Democracy Charter as it has 
binding status on the community of members on issues of democracy and good governance.151 In 
particular, it insists that regime change must be through free, fair and transparent elections.152  It 
further calls for zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means.153 The 
normative merits of the Protocol extend further since provisions dealing with other democratic and 
human rights principles are also reiterated.154  
 
Specifically on elections,155 one can perceive the elements of freeness and fairness which reflect 
the electoral problems of the region. Accordingly, the holding of elections as per electoral laws,156 
prohibition of substantial amendment of electoral laws,157 the establishment of independent 
electoral bodies,158 the arrangement of reliable and transparent voter registrations,159 the 
announcement of results in a transparent manner,160 establishment of adequate complaint 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Economic and Corporate Governance; AHG/235 (XXXVIII). Annex I (2001) para.3 <http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/ 
documents/2.pdf> (accessed 18 September 2007) 1. 
146 As above, paras.7 and 13. 
147 As above, para. 7 
148 As above. 
149 As above. 
150 R Herbert ‘The Survival of NEPAD and the African Peer Review Mechanism: A Critical Analysis’ (2004) 11:1 South 
African Journal of International Affairs 1 2. 
151 Protocol A/ SP1/12 /01 On Democracy and Good Governance: Supplementary to the Protocol Relating to the 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace Keeping and Security, adopted in December 2001 
and entered into force in 2005.< http://www.dpmf.org/role-ecowas-peace-amadu.html> (accessed 17 September 2007)  
152 Article 1(b). 
153 Article 1(c). 
154 An overview of the Protocol reveals that it follows an all rounded approach to deal with the problems of the region or 
for that matter the continent as a whole by stipulating detailed provisions. 
155 Section II, Articles 2-18 are dedicated to substantive and enforcement issues of elections. 
156 Article 2(2).  
157 Article 2(1).  
158 Article 3.  
159 Article 4.  
160 Article 6.  
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mechanisms,161 the full collaboration with civil society in the provision of voter education,162 the 
need for conceding to defeat according to guidelines163 and lastly the prohibition of acts of 
intimidation or harassment against defeated candidates or their supporters by all power holders164 
constitute relevant in the case at hand. 
 
The possibility of electoral assistance is also envisaged upon the request of member states165 
while it provides a robust mechanism of election monitoring which does not leave it to the 
discretion of the member state to involve the Commission.166 Its implementation is also 
accompanied by sanctions in cases of non-compliance which would additionally be governed by 
the ECOWAS Peace protocol.167 The range of sanctions includes the use of the ECOWAS Court of 
Justice.168 
 
The Protocol has been put to effect in some occasions to prevent the incumbency of 
undemocratically seated governments as much as it is criticized for the failure of monitoring 
missions to impact so much on electoral standards.169 But, its possible impact on the new 
Democracy Charter is conceivable. On the whole, it is the best effort that provided a binding and 
reasonably sufficient framework in addressing the listed electoral problems, though of sub-regional 
applicability. 
 
3.8. OAU/AU Declaration on Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa (2002) 
 
This declaration is entirely dedicated to assert the necessity of democratic elections in any 
representative government.170  It took cognizance of previous efforts, the growing role played by 
the OAU in the observation/monitoring of elections and the need to strengthen the Organization’s 
efforts in setting the principles of democratic elections in Africa.171 At best, it can serve as a 
guideline as to what constitutes freeness and fairness as well as the responsibilities of member 
states.172 The detailed provisions of the declaration also stipulate the rights and corresponding 
duties of all stakeholders.173 The roles of OAU in monitoring elections as well as that of the General 
Secretariat in ensuring the implementation of the Declaration are also set out.174 
                                                 
161 Article 7. 
162 Article 8.  
163 Article 9. 
164 Article 10. 
165 Article 12. 
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171 See the Preamble.  
172 See Part IV.  
173 See Part V.  
174 See Part VI. 
 21
 
Compared to previous commitments, it provides for more clear and specific guidelines as to what 
constitutes free and fair elections. However, its status as a legally non-binding instrument leaves it 
as mere statement of common aspiration. Also, it does not address cases of non-compliance with 
the principles or how they should be handled. But as the new Democracy Charter provides, it is the 
primary source for the interpretation of free and fair elections and hence of importance in 
addressing electoral problems in Africa.175  
 
3.9. Some Conclusions 
 
Earlier efforts are not limited to the documents discussed in the preceding sections. The 
impressive outlay of documents adopted at different times indicates a steady shift towards the 
acceptance of democratic values. Concerning elections, however, except for the sub-regional 
commitment, nearly all of them fail to provide explicit and a binding framework in enforcing free and 
fair elections in Africa. Rather, these set of principles can morally and politically put pressure on 
states towards the fulfilment of democratic qualities in elections as a kind of soft law. Dougard 
refers to soft law as imprecise standards generated, among others, by international organisations 
to serve as guidelines to states but which lack the status of law.176  On a different note, as much as 
they expressed the aspirations of states, they failed to impact on the behaviour of states, an 
implication to the present as will be dealt in the forthcoming chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
175 Article 17. 
176 J Dugard International Law: A South African Perspective (2005) 37. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Assessment of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance in Light of the 
Electoral Problems in Africa 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The importance of elections as the most visible expressions of the will of the public in a system of 
electoral democracy and the five major problems that plague elections in Africa have been outlined 
in the preceding Chapters. The new Charter, inter alia, proposes to address the above identified 
problems. This chapter analyzes the effectiveness of the charter, if adopted, on democratic 
consolidation in Africa, through elections, both at individual states and continental levels, by 
focusing on the analysis of the key problems in light of the Charter’s provisions. The legislative 
background and its rationale are provided as an introduction along with its application to the 
identified problems with the possible challenges and the recommendations.  
 
4.1.1. Legislative History and the Rationale of the Charter 
 
The Charter is a consolidation of earlier commitments through various declarations and decisions 
of the Union to ensure the success of the democratisation process on the continent.177 The 
Charter’s adoption was triggered by the decisions taken by Head of States and Governments 
during the 2002 inaugural summit held in Durban, South Africa,178 which was followed by the 
conference on Elections, Democracy, and Governance held in Pretoria, South Africa in 2003.179 
The conference objectives included promotion of dialogue, democracy and good governance; 
standardisation of norms related to elections; capacity building of electoral management bodies; 
and the discussion on the African Union Draft Declaration on Elections, Democracy and 
Governance in Africa.180 
 
This conference culminated in the adoption of key democratic principles of governance on, inter 
alia, electoral practises and the requirements of freeness and fairness,181 leading to the meeting of 
                                                 
177 Report on the Meeting of the Independent Experts on the Draft Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 21-23 November 2005. <http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/conferences/past/2006/ 
april/pa/apr7/meeting.htm> (accessed 27 September 2007) 5.   
178 As above, 8. The summit adopted two Declarations namely, the OAU Declaration on the Principles Governing 
Democratic Elections in Africa, and the NEPAD Declaration on Democracy and Governance. 
179Preamble of the Conference Statement to the Africa Conference on Elections, Democracy and Governance, Pretoria, 
South Africa on April 7-10/2003 available at <http://www.elections.org.za/AfricaConference/Default.asp> (accessed 20 
August 2007). It was held under the theme ‘Strengthening African Initiatives.’  
180 Preamble of the statement of the conference (n 179 above). 
181 The statement provided for detailed set of principles that deal with democratic values and institutions to promote 
constitutionalism and good governance, promotion of human rights, constitutional determination of tenure, establishment 
of effective and independent electoral management bodies, political pluralism, tolerance and political freedom, 
substantive as well as procedural principles to institutionalize certainty and predictability of election rules, procedures and 
outcomes; the use of public media; election related conflicts; the role of the judiciary; the need for a code of conduct and 
election observers and monitors; and review of their work through peer review mechanism.  
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government experts held in May 2004 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia which further discussed the 
outcome of the Pretoria meeting.182 Accordingly, it recommended the development of a Charter on 
Democracy, Elections and Governance on the basis of pre-existing documents.183 This led to the 
formulation of the Charter which was discussed at the Ministerial meeting held in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia on 6-7 April 2006184 that was finally adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government of the AU on 30 January 2007.185    
 
The Charter reinforces the commitment of AU Member States to democracy, development and 
peace.186 It aims at strengthening democratic institutions and entrenching a culture of democracy 
and peace and multi-party competitive politics.187 This was visible from the repeatedly affirmed 
commitment of member States in the Charter towards institutionalisation of democratic, social, 
economic and political governance.188 
 
In particular, halting unconstitutional change of governments is pronounced like that of previous 
documents as a justification for its adoption.189 The Charter is intended to provide a robust and 
responsive mechanism in addressing the existing and future challenges to democracy and 
development.190 As such, it is only a restatement of earlier commitments and hence the question of 
whether it will successfully respond to the problems in the democratisation project and in particular 
that of electoral processes of the continent remains to be seen in the future. 
 
4.1.2. Overview of the Features of the Charter 
 
The Charter has three basic pillars namely democracy, elections and governance. Under the rubric 
of these concepts various democratic values are reiterated such as the promotion of democracy, 
rule of law and human rights. It enjoins states to recognise popular participation through universal 
suffrage as the inalienable right of the people,191 and to ensure constitutional transfer of power.192 
The enjoyment of fundamental freedoms and rights without any indivisibility, taking into account 
                                                 
182 Experts’ report (n 177 above) 9. 
183As above. Following the Pretoria Conference, the AU Commission embarked upon 1) the review of the OAU /AU 
Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections and its accompanying Guidelines for Election Observation 
of the AU observers 2) the prospects for the establishment of the Electoral Assistance Fund and Unit as envisaged in the 
previous instruments 3) the preparation of a draft Declaration on Democracy, Elections, and Governance. This meeting 
led to the transformation of the draft Declaration into a Charter having regard to its status as a non- binding instrument to 
enforce the already existing commitments.  
184 Ebobrah (n 38 above) 2. 
185 As above.  
186Experts’ and Ministerial Meetings on the Draft Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance: and the Lome 
Declaration, 3-4 and 6-7 April 2006 ‘ Draft Charter on Democracy , Elections and Governance: Explanatory Note’ 
<http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/conferences/past/2006/april/pa/apr7/meeting.htm> (accessed  23 September 2007) 
See generally Articles 2 and 3 for the detailed objectives and the principles of the Charter. 
187 Experts’ report (n 177 above) 6. 
188 Explanatory note (n 186 above). 
189 See the experts’ report (n 177 above) 6 and the Preamble of the Charter which states that they have been the cause 
of insecurity, instability and violent conflict in Africa.  
190 Report of the Ministerial Meeting on the African Draft Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and the 
Lome Declaration ,Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 6-7 April 2006 (2006) 3.(Report, on file with the researcher). 
191 Article 4.  
192 Article 5. 
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their universality,193 the strengthening of organs in the AU which promote human rights,194 
eradication of discrimination against vulnerable groups, minorities and the promotion of culture of 
tolerance of diversity as states’ obligations are heralded.195 
 
In addition, the entrenchment of constitutional supremacy,196 the culture of democracy and peace 
through transparent and accountable administration, civil engagement, civic education, political 
dialogue197 and the promotion of democratic institutions form part of the commitments.198 
 
The crux of the present work analyses provisions governing democratic elections as provided 
under Chapter 7 of the Charter. Accordingly, the requirements of free and fair elections,199 the 
possibilities of securing electoral assistance, observer missions and exploratory missions from the 
AU Commission, and their regulation200 are stipulated. It further provides for unconstitutional 
change of governments by outlining the possible elements thereof,201 measures to be taken upon 
its occurrence,202 the implementing body203 and the corresponding duties of state parties.204  
 
The governance aspect of the Charter focuses on states’ duties in the promotion of political, 
economic and social governance by creating strong institutions and by promoting the development 
of the private sector,205 and coordination of governments, civil society, and the private sector.206 
The Charter also recognized the role of women in development and democratic processes and 
enjoined states to take measures to promote their full participation.207 
 
 Popular participation,208 especially, of people with special needs,209 institutionalisation of political, 
economic and corporate governance,210 decentralization of power,211 inclusion of traditional 
authorities212 are stipulated. To this end, states are obliged to promote the use of international and 
sub-regional commitments213 and encourage solidarity among member states.214 Other duties such 
as the adoption of policies, strategies and programmes to alleviate poverty,215 to provide basic 
                                                 
193 Article 6.  
194 Article 7.  
195 Articles 7 and 8.  
196 Article 10.  
197 Articles 12 and 13.  
198 Articles 15 and 16.  
199 Article  17.  
200 Articles 18-21.  
201 Article 23.  
202 Article 25.  
203 Articles 24 and 25.  
204 Article 25. 
205 Article 27. 
206 Article 28. 
207 Article 29.   
208 Article 30.  
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210 Articles 32 and 33.  
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212 Article 35.  
213 Articles 36 and 37.   
214 Articles 38 and 39.  
215 Article 40.  
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social services,216 to protect the environment217 and to provide free and compulsory basic 
education are enshrined. 218 
 
In the end, the application mechanism of the Charter outlined the respective duties of member 
states and that of the primary enforcement organ i.e. the AU commission.219 It also stipulates the 
monitoring mechanism under the Charter and the duties of the states and monitoring organs.220 On 
the whole, the Charter provides for an array of value laden concepts translated into state 
obligations covering a range of issues.  
 
4.2. Normative Standards of Democratic Elections 
The Charter provides for various value laden principles calling for the commitment of states to 
ensure their effective implementation. Among these, the holding of free and fair elections 
constitutes one. The substantive essence of the provisions on democratic elections in terms of 
sufficiency is discussed below. 
 
4.2.1. Overview of the Standards 
 
Among the range of objectives the Charter reiterated, electoral related issues feature laudably. 
Accordingly, it seeks to: 
Entrench a political culture of change of power based on the holding of regular, free, fair and transparent 
elections conducted by competent, independent and impartial national electoral bodies.221 
 
Notionally, the Charter’s aims at institutionalising legitimate and democratic change of 
governments,222 by promoting the holding of regular, transparent, free and fair elections.223 The 
criterion of “freeness” and “fairness” stand as a litmus test for democratic elections under the 
Charter. Thus, the holding of transparent, free and fair elections must be made in accordance with 
the AU Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa.224 Instead of 
providing for the criteria of freeness and fairness, the Charter makes cross reference to the 
Declaration setting out principles on democratic elections. 
 
The OAU/AU Declaration envisages elections conducted: 
freely and fairly225 under democratic constitutions and in compliance with supportive legal instruments, 226under 
a system of separation of powers that ensures in particular, the independence of the judiciary,227 at regular 
intervals, as provided for in national constitutions,228 by impartial, all-inclusive competent accountable electoral 
institutions staffed by well-trained personnel and equipped with adequate logistics.229  
                                                 
216 Article 41. 
217 Article 42.  
218 Article 43. 
219 See generally Chapter 10.  
220 See generally Chapter 11.  
221 Preamble. 
222 Article 2(3).  
223 Article 3(3) and (4).  
224 Article 17. 
225 Para. 4(a). 
226 Para. 4(b). 
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228 Para. 4(d). 
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To this end, states commit themselves to take measures, inter alia, to establish institutions which 
administer elections and their process and draw codes of conduct, including impartial, an all 
inclusive, competent and accountable national electoral bodies and constitutional courts to 
arbitrate in the event of disputes arising from the conduct of elections.230 The promotion and 
protection of civil liberties including freedom of movement, assembly, association, expression and 
campaigning as well as access to the media form part of the commitments.231  
 
It further provides for the need to take measures and precautions to prevent the perpetration of 
fraud, rigging or any other illegal practises throughout the electoral processes.232 To this end, 
states are required to ensure transparency of the entire electoral process by facilitating the 
deployment of representatives of political parties and individual candidates at polling and counting 
stations and accredited international and national observers.233  
 
In translating these principles into rights and obligations, the Declaration provides for the rights of 
individuals and party candidates to basic freedoms.234 On the other hand, it prohibits acts that may 
lead to violence or the deprivation of rights and the granting of favours to influence the outcome of 
elections.235 It also stipulates the need for the impartiality of the media,236 the respect for the 
decisions of election related adjudication bodies as well as the opportunity to challenge them 
according to the law.237 
 
States are required to provide adequate logistics and resources including funds for carrying out 
elections to all registered parties to enable them to organise their work.238 The need to closely work 
with civil society with the view to promoting voter education is stipulated as a measure to be taken 
by states.239 Thus, within the spirit of the Charter, the concepts of freeness and fairness are the 
indices reiterated in the Declaration. 
 
Perhaps, a third aspect included as a distinct component is what is named, according to the 
European approach, the “transparency” of elections.240 Bjourlund avers that to be transparent, an 
election must have predictable procedures, have published results, both aggregated and broken 
down by constituency, and polling station, and ensure security against fraud.241  
 
Whereas the Charter explicitly speaks of only four scenarios as states’ obligations, including the 
establishment and strengthening of independent and impartial national electoral management 
                                                 
230 Para. 3( b) and (c). 
231 Para. 3(d). 
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bodies,242 the establishment and strengthening of national mechanisms responsible to redress 
election related disputes,243 fair and equitable access to state controlled media by contesting 
parties and candidates,244 and the adoption of code of conduct governing stakeholders.245 Thus far, 
it seems not to go further enough in addressing all the identified problems. 
 
4.2.2. Principal Elements Addressed Under the Charter 
 
4.2.2.1. Establishment and Strengthening of Independent and Impartial National Electoral 
Management Bodies  
 
The Charter primarily obliges state parties to establish and strengthen independent and impartial 
national electoral management bodies. As Mozaffar noted, electoral management bodies are the 
‘…principal instruments for organizing credible election processes, linking voters and governments 
in order to secure procedural legitimacy for the substantive uncertainty inherent in competitive 
elections.’246 Their institutional effectiveness depends largely, though not exclusively on their 
autonomy from the government.247 This conceptual understanding is also reflected in the different 
regional commitments discussed, as affirmed in the Charter. 
 
The trends in Africa, however, show that the dearth of such institutions led to the mis-management 
of elections leading to electoral frauds and subsequent violence resulting in the violation of rights. 
Thus, the fact that the Charter enjoins states to establish and strengthen independent electoral 
management bodies248 is vital in addressing problems in electoral management bodies observed in 
recent elections in Africa. However, it seems inadequate compared to for instance, the ECOWAS 
Protocol which further requires that they should enjoy the confidence of all political actors.249 
 
As Murphy argues, the established impartial, all-inclusive, competent and accountable national 
electoral bodies ‘…generally have the responsibility to ensure conditions conducive to free and fair 
elections and for all matters involving the electoral process.’250 To this end, states are obliged to 
provide these institutions with sufficient resources to perform their assigned missions efficiently 
and effectively as provided in the charter.251 
 
 
 
                                                 
242 Article 17(1). 
243 Article 17(2). 
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246 S Mozaffar ‘Patterns of Electoral Governance in Africa’s emerging Democracies’ (2002) 23:1 International Political 
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247 As above, 85. 
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249 Article 3. 
250 J Murphy ‘An Independent Electoral Commission’ in Steytler et al. Free and Fair Elections (1994) 25 35. 
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4.2.2.2. Establishment of National Mechanisms Responsible for Redressing Election Related 
Disputes  
 
The Charter generally obliges states to enhance the independence or autonomy of institutions 
guaranteed by the constitution, and ensures that they are accountable to competent national 
organs.252 These provisions are applicable, be it to electoral commissions or the judiciary which are 
the appropriate forums to redress electoral disputes. 
 
Hence, according to the Charter, states should enhance and strengthen these mechanisms to 
ensure a timely redress.253 In particular, given the history of marginalisation of the judiciary in the 
politics of states, such interpretation supports the current democratic and constitutional reforms in 
the continent that give them far greater authority in electoral matters.254  
 
 By rejecting unconstitutional change of governments, including the extension of presidential tenure 
and by upholding electoral related petitions courts have demonstrated their key role as democratic 
watchdogs.255 This is in part proved by the Ugandan courts in upholding the oppositions’ election 
petitions alleging electoral mal-practices. Sustaining this zeal requires the establishment of 
competent legal entities including effective constitutional courts to arbitrate electoral disputes. 
 
Although the Charter requires ‘timely disposition’ as an end result of the establishment or the 
enhancement of these institutions,256 the element of “independence” should be infused to 
guarantee their effectiveness. The inclusion of other institutions such as ombudsman and human 
rights institutions should be envisaged within the ambit in order to ensure that claims of citizens are 
redressed effectively.257 
 
4.2.2.3. Fair and Equitable Access to state Controlled Media  
 According to Shedler, plural information source is crucial in ensuring effective choice in democratic 
elections.258 Accordingly, candidates should enjoy political space if the will of the people is to be 
expressed through voting.259 In effect, media is a key instrument in democratisation process.260 
The Charter, in providing for this obligation has reinforced the understanding mentioned above. 
However, this should mean not only ensuring equal access, but also refraining from any act that 
                                                 
252 Article 15(2).  
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259 As above. 
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might constrain or limit their adversaries form using the facilities of public media for campaign 
purposes.261  
 
As an element of fairness, the state should create level playing field for all political stakeholders by 
promoting freedom of expression, freedom of the press, by fostering a professional media which is 
the basis for democracy on the continent.262 Especially, the need to professionalize journalists 
through massive trainings and equipping the enterprise with resources would make a huge 
difference in ensuring editorial autonomy and in turn impartial performance.263 As Kessel counsels, 
they should desist from being   ‘…the praise singer of the ruler or unashamed propagandist of the 
opposition.’264     
 
4.2.2.4. Adoption of Code of Conduct  
The agreement of all parties through the adoption of a code of conduct would contribute to 
peaceful, credible elections ensuring the legitimacy of the election results. Under the Charter, it is 
provided that the code should include the commitment of political stakeholders to accept election 
results.265 The Declaration on the other hand requires that elections be free and fair when the 
results are announced by the competent national bodies as provided for in the constitution and the 
electoral laws.266 The Charter however emphasises this duty on political stakeholders, understood 
as ‘political parties’, as opposed to the Declaration which commits ‘every citizen’ to respect the 
decision of an electoral management bodies.267  
  
Under the Charter, states have the obligation to inculcate and strengthen political pluralism 
through, among others, the recognition of the roles, rights and duties of legally constituted political 
parties.268 In reality, however, constitutional or legislative engineering has resulted in the 
systematic exclusion of opposition from electoral competition.269 In this case, the phrase ‘legally 
recognised political parties’ does not escape scrutiny.270 The fact that it implies state discretion to 
determine who is ‘legal’ poses a threat to the effective participation of parties which may have 
stood as a strong contender to the governing regime.271 It is also surprising that the term appeared 
in this document while no mention of legality is made in the ECOWAS Protocol as well as the OAU 
Declaration on Democratic Elections.272  
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4.2.3. Principles Omitted from the Charter  
Even if the Charter made a reference to some important aspects of free and fair elections in Africa, 
its key omissions puts its efficacy in addressing few of the discussed electoral problems as a 
standard setting document in question. The following sections thus will demonstrate these 
omissions and their implications in light of the electoral problems discussed. 
 
4.2.3.1. Manipulation of Elections 
There is evidence that fraudulent and non-competitive elections in Africa have repeatedly 
legitimised authoritarian incumbent regimes.273 Elections are a farce once they are characterised 
by extensive frauds, riggings and falsification of results.274 As Shedler put it, ‘…electoral alchemy 
has been a favoured pursuit of authoritarian incumbents worried by the uncertainty of transitional 
elections.’275 
 
To date, this has been the persisting problem of elections in Africa since virtually all of the case 
examples cited in this research have been plagued by electoral fraud. All of them affirmed the 
authority of an incumbent regime or facilitated for the election of a hand picked successor. While 
the ECOWAS Protocol attempts to address some of the facets of election related frauds such as 
double voting,276 the Charter is woefully silent on these issues making its importance as a binding 
framework governing democratic elections a failed effort.  
 
Save for providing for unconstitutional change of governments, it is silent on the issue of accessing 
of power through the avenue of rigged and fraudulent elections. To this extent, the OAU/AU 
Declaration clearly obliges states to prevent any electoral fraud throughout the whole electoral 
process.277 To deter fraud and manipulation, Calingaert suggests the promotion of transparency in 
the entire electoral process by election observers, the substantial representation of opposition 
parties or independent candidates on election commissions, the effective monitoring of every stage 
of the electoral process, and the documentation and publication of any abuses that take place.278 
 
 As a result, appropriate and well-enforced election laws and regulations are critical for ensuring 
the transparency of electoral processes.279 Independent electoral commissions, to this end, play an 
important role while watch dogs of democracy such as the judiciary and human rights institutions 
ensure the enforcement of the laws. According to Nevitte and Canton, to achieve democratic 
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consolidation and the institutionalisation of democratic procedures, potential contributions of non-
partisan domestic election-monitoring groups are significant.280 It is also important to make the 
public aware of the likely threats to fair elections and to election officials and ruling party agents on 
the legal penalties for violations of the election law and the need to ensure prosecution of any such 
violations.281 
   
4.2.3.2. Use of State Resources 
While the Charter refers to the unfair use of the state media, it fails to provide for the duty not to 
abuse state resources for campaign purposes. As de Vos states ‘…it will give the incumbent 
regime an unfair advantage constituting an unfair election practice.’282 Thus, the Declaration will 
provide assistance in determining states’ obligation. 
Accordingly, states’ obligation of  availing adequate resources for carrying out democratic elections 
for all registered political parties to enable them organise their work, including participation in 
electoral process should be discharged.283 To this end, safeguards from abuse such as 
constitutions and electoral laws which put a check on the governing regime as well as 
administrative reforms must be put in place.284 
 
4.2.3.3. Repression of Human Rights 
Underpinning democratic elections is the enjoyment of civil liberties guaranteed in national and 
international laws. Elections can not be free unless these rights are secured. The recent elections 
in the mentioned countries show that incumbents have violated the rule of law by breaking laws 
that guarantee civil and political rights.285  As Beetham wrote, ‘…democratic rights such as freedom 
of thought, conscience, movement etc. presuppose a capacity of self-conscious and reasoned 
choice in matters affecting ones own life.’286  
 
Given the reality in Africa, the lacuna in the Charter can not be accounted for.287 Conversely, the 
OAU Declaration guarantees civil liberties and prohibits any act that deprives constitutional rights 
and liberties.288 Hence, here too, unless the wider human rights protection in the Charter is made 
applicable, provisions on democratic elections remain to be insufficient. Additionally, the cross 
reference to the OAU declaration would lead to this interpretation.   
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4.2.3.4. Some Conclusions  
The stipulation of some of the few elements of free and fair elections in the Charter can not be 
reasonably explained as it limits states’ obligations in relation to the holding of democratic elections 
to the mentioned ones. While it aims to govern, inter alia, democratic elections as a binding 
document, it falls short of establishing robust standards unlike the ECOWAS Protocol.289 
Consequently, the cross reference to a pre-existing but a non-binding set of principles as a guide 
to elaborate democratic elections downgrades its value as a self-standing instrument. 
 
The cross reference to the OAU Declaration for elaboration of states’ duties is intended to address 
the identified issues. This by itself is problematic as it deprives the Charter of its normative value in 
addressing standing issues of the continent. Its application fully depends on the constant allusion 
to the Declaration, which is not an easy task. On a positive note, however, the latter can have an 
interpretive value providing detailed guidelines in ensuring democratic elections in Africa. Upon 
coming into force, the normative application of the Charter should take this stance if it is to 
succeed.  
 
4.3. Application of the Charter  
To give effect to the Charter’s commitments, the respective obligations of state parties and that of 
the principal enforcer of the Charter, the AU Commission, at a continental and regional level have 
been provided.290 The monitoring mechanism under the Charter should ensure the proper 
enforcement of these obligations in the realization of the principles enshrined therein. Accordingly, 
the following sections would analyse the obligations and the existing enforcement mechanisms. In 
particular, the effectiveness of the different implementation mechanisms in addressing existing 
electoral problems in Africa would be assessed. 
 
4.3.1. State Party level  
Broadly speaking, the Charter imposes three main duties on states to ensure the implementation of 
its provisions. These include legislative,291 executive and administrative292 and promotional 
measures.293 Each duty and what it entails is succinctly described below. 
4.3.1.1. Legislative Measures 
The duty to take legislative measures294 entails the enactment of laws which promote free and fair 
elections within the spirit of international law and specifically the Charter. Most importantly, 
constitutions and electoral laws should aim to enforce the commitments reiterated in the Charter. It 
                                                 
289 Though Section II of the ECOWAS Protocol does not define what freeness and fairness constitute, some of the 
elements are portrayed in the provisions dealing with elections.    
290 See Chapter 10, Articles 44 and 45. 
291 Article 44(1) (a) and 44 (1) (d).  
292 As above. 
293 Article 44(1) (b) and (c).  
294 Article 44(1) (a). 
 33
further obliges states to incorporate the commitments and principles of the Charter in their national 
policies and strategies.295  
The notion of constitutionalism requires the existence of rules that determine the validity of actions 
of the state prescribing a procedure to be followed and curb the arbitrariness of the powers.296 
Likewise, democratic elections can only be ascertained when rules and procedures govern the 
actions of governments and political actors by providing an accountability mechanism.297 
Thus, though the Charter fails to address the issues of electoral manipulations and repression of 
human rights, the principles enshrined in the Declaration should essentially form the rules of 
elections in the laws of state parties. 
4.3.1.2. Executive and Administrative Measures 
Sustainable democracy needs the consolidation of institutional frameworks which make the 
process independent of the persons who are in power.298 This can occur if only states embark on 
legal and institutional reforms and through governing regulations that make the creation of 
democratic institutions possible.  
With this in view, the Charter places an obligation on states to take executive and administrative 
actions to bring national laws and regulations into conformity with the charter.299 In so doing, states 
must ensure the enactment of rules and regulations governing institutions of democracy such as 
independent electoral commissions, human rights institutions and the judiciary in accordance with 
the provisions of the Charter so as to institutionalise democracy.  
4.3.1.3. Promotional Measures 
The Charter stipulates a two tiered duty on states which can generally be categorised under the 
rubric of promotional measures. Primarily, it enjoins states to undertake wider dissemination work 
on the principles of the Charter and other laws enacted to give it effect.300 This duty entails an 
obligation to create awareness among the public at large enabling the citizenry to have an 
informed say in democratisation process. Thus, it is mandatory for states to establish independent 
public institutions that promote and support democracy within the purview of the Charter.301 These 
include auditors, electoral commissions, anti-corruption commissions, and national human rights 
                                                 
295 Article 44(1(d). 
296 J Hatchard; M Ndulo and P Slinn Comparative Constitutionalism and Good Governance in the Common Wealth: An 
Eastern and Southern African Perspective (2004) 1. 
297 As above. 
298 J Abbink ‘Rethinking Democratization and Election Observation’ in J Abbink and G Hesseling (eds) Election 
Observation and Democratization in Africa (2000) 1 7. 
299 Article 10(1) (a). 
300 Article 44(1) (b). 
301 Article 15.  
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institutions which can act as oversight mechanisms to prevent improper state action and improve 
governance.302 
Yet, another important measure is the creation of a space for non-state actors in the promotion of 
the Charter and domestic laws. Although the state itself bears the prime responsibility, emboldened 
civil society can contribute significantly in this process.303 To this end, the Charter further obliges 
states to create conducive conditions for civil society organisations to exist and operate within the 
law.304 Entrenching democratic culture requires the integration of civic education in education 
curricula and the development of programmes and activities as provided in the Charter.305  
It is also imperative to recognise the role of independent media in ensuring the free flow and 
dissemination of information, views, and opinions relevant to the electoral process.306 The Charter 
reiterates this notion by obliging states to promote the conditions necessary to foster participation 
through freedom of the press and access to information.307 Prempeh asserts that multiple 
independent media organizations in Africa serve as ‘…a check on the integrity of national election 
administration thereby lending greater legitimacy to officially declared results.’308 Hence, states’ 
involvement in publicly owned media should not be intrusive to an extent of eroding freedom of 
expression and undermining its independence.309 
Secondly, the Charter demands that states instil political will necessary for the attainment of the 
goals set forth in it.310 Democracy will truly last when political actors are earnestly involved in it.311 
In this regard, it requires states to inculcate democratic values within the three government arms 
and as powerful institution to bring on board all parties in the political process. The differences in 
programmes of parties should not entail fragmentation and countervailing effects. Rather, it should 
help foster a healthy competition which is an essential ingredient in democratic elections. In 
addition, the commitment would galvanize states’ efforts in promoting democratic elections in the 
continent through the various frameworks of cooperation that exist within the region.  
 
 
                                                 
302 L C Reif ‘Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in Good Governance and 
Human Rights Protection’ (2000) 13:8 Harvard Human Rights Journal 1 1. 
303 Prempheh (n 254 above) 82. 
304 Article 12(3). 
305 Article 12(4). 
306 J Sarkin ‘The South African Media in the Transition to Democracy’ in Steytler et al. Free and Fair Elections (1994) 
154. 
307 Article 2(10).  
308 Prempeh (n 254 above) 83. 
309 Sarkin (n 306 above) 181. 
310 Article 44(1)(d). 
311 M Bratton and N V de Walle Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transition in Comparative Perspective (1997) 
279. 
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4.3.2. The AU Commission  
As the secretariat of the Union, the AU Commission (AUC) is at the heart of the endeavours to 
implement the objectives of the African Union.312 Under the Charter, it is mandated to act as the 
central coordinating body by overseeing the implementation as well as assisting state parties in 
their implementation efforts.313 It is also required to coordinate the evaluation of the Charter’s 
implementation with other organs of the AU, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and 
appropriate national structures.314 Since the Charter addresses cross cutting issues, the 
involvement of the other organs would offer proper guidance towards its effective implementation. 
Accordingly, in relation to elections too, it is entrusted with wider mandates at regional as well as 
continental levels as discussed below.315 
4.3.2.1. At a Continental Level 
The Commission is required to develop bench marks for the implementation of the commitments 
and principles of the Charter and evaluate compliance by state parties.316 In particular, given the 
fact that substantive obligations in undertaking democratic elections are deficient, the benchmarks 
would establish a uniform standard to be applicable in the continent as a whole. This creates a 
clear mechanism in overseeing state compliance to the provisions of the Charter.  
The Commission is further obliged to promote the creation of favourable conditions for democratic 
governance, in particular, by facilitating the harmonisation of policies and laws of state parties.317 
Given the fact that continent suffers from weak integration system,318 this duty poses a challenge to 
the commission’s effectiveness. In addition, the numerous outlay of normative standards would be 
applicable only through effective harmonisation efforts. These require the necessary institutional 
and financial capacities, which the Commission is lacking at present.319  
The Charter also envisages the possibility of electoral assistance to be facilitated by the 
Commission through the Electoral Assistance Unit and the Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
Fund established under the Commission.320 The OAU/AU Declaration on Democratic Elections, 
among other things, focuses on the need for adequate funding of elections. Thus, the Interim 
                                                 
312 Commission of the African Union ‘Strategic Plan if the Commission of the African Union, Volume 2: 2004-2007, 
Strategic Framework of the Commission of the African Union’ 2004 <http://www.africaunion. orgAU%20summit%202004/ 
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313 Article 45 (a) and (b). 
314 Article 44(2)(B).  
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316 Article 44 (2) (A) (a). 
317 Article 44(2)(A) (b).  
318 (n 312 above) 6. 
319 As above 7. 
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Commission of the African Union has been mandated to mobilize extra-budgetary funds to 
augment the secretariat’s resource base for the implementation of the Declaration.321  
Considering the fact that election administration in Africa is weak due to logistical reasons, the 
establishment of the fund would have a significant contribution. However, the funding should target 
the building of a strong and stable electoral administration capacity which is a better long-term 
investment than ad hoc contributions to electoral events.322 De Zeeuw states that; 
[t]he assistance should focus on constitutional and legal reforms, establishment of election 
administration(including national election commission) monitoring ,training of election staff, political party 
assistance, international election monitoring, civil society aid (e.g. voter education and  election monitoring).323 
The scheme could be a reality if the Commission is able to raise the resource required from donors 
and state parties to the Charter. This depends on its vigorous effort and the political will of all 
stakeholders concerned. 
4.3.2.2. At a Regional Level 
The mandate essentially relates to the establishment of frameworks for cooperation with regional 
economic communities.324 This involves encouraging the ratification and adherence to the Charter 
and designation of focal points to facilitate its implementation with the participation of stakeholders, 
in particular, civil society organizations.325 Well intentioned the idea of cooperation may be, the 
existence of several integration groupings in the five regions of the continent has been problematic 
to the Commission itself.326 The lack of leadership and coordinated goal, scattered researches, 
competition that thwarts solidarity and the resulting donor fatigue are some of the reasons to be 
mentioned.327 
Even so, the vision of creating an integrated Africa as stipulated in the AU Constitutive Act requires 
the emergence of virile regional communities striving to remove all barriers to harmonisation of 
their policies and programmes.328 In particular, some of the efforts made in ensuring democratic 
elections by RECs such as the ECOWAS had put exerted pressure on the states to make an effort 
with the minimum requirements of free and fair elections. Thus, the contribution of RECs should be 
encouraged by the Commission, albeit the necessity of political will that determines its success. 
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4.4. Monitoring the Implementation of the Charter  
Parallel to the respective duties of the implementation of the Charter, its monitoring mechanisms 
generally fall under two categories; namely reporting and electoral observation missions. Though 
such distinct categories are not provided, a holistic reading indicates to this effect. The following 
sections will discuss if the Charter warrantees effective monitoring mechanisms. 
4.4.1. Reporting Mechanism 
State parties are obliged to submit a report every two years from the date of enforcement to the 
Commission on legislative as well as other measures taken to give effect to the Charter.329 A copy 
of the report shall be submitted to the relevant organs of the Union for appropriate action to be 
taken within their respective mandates.330 But the Commission also prepares the copy of the report 
to the AU Assembly through the Executive Council which takes appropriate measures with the 
view to addressing the issues raised in the report.331  
This procedure seems to be designed along the lines of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) which has a similar procedure apart from the fact that the Democracy 
Charter involves other organs in consideration of the report.332 Under the Democracy Charter, the 
organs indicated are the ones found under Article 5 of the Constitutive Act. The actual decision 
making power lies in the AU Assembly rendering their involvement less useful.333 The other organs 
could possibly take an advisory role on the different cross cutting issues to assist the Assembly in 
its determination on the reports submitted. 
It is interesting to note that no communication procedure is envisaged under the Charter. In effect, 
it is merely a standard setting document laying down states’ obligations. Concerning individual 
complaint mechanism, it may be argued that the deliberate framing of the Charter rules out such 
possibility. This obviously bars prospects for actions to be brought by civil society organisations 
and individuals for violations of the principles of the Charter by state parties. In particular, given 
that the African Court of justice is mentioned as one of the relevant bodies in the implementation of 
the Charter, its significance as an adjudicatory body is downgraded.334 Thus, in line with the 
                                                 
329 Article 49 (1). 
330 Article 49(2). 
331 Article 49(3) and (4). 
332 Ebobrah states that the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights proposed to take the role of examination 
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333 Article 6 of the AU Constitutive Act and Article 49(4) of the Charter. 
334 The African Court of Justice established under the AU Constitutive Act is on the way to be merged with the African 
Court on Human and peoples’ Rights which was established by its Protocol in June 1998 as decided by the resolution of 
the AU Summit in July 2004. Accordingly, upon its coming to operation, the Protocol establishing the court would be the 
applicable law.  
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mandate of the African court on human and Peoples’ Rights, it may provide advisory opinion at the 
request of states on any legal matter relating to the Democracy Charter.335  
Considering the fact that states have a duty to promote political will and to coordinate efforts to 
ensure the implementation of the Charter,336 the absence of inter-state complaint mechanism is 
also another of its loopholes. Indeed, most states have not discharged their reporting duties even 
under the ACHPR system, in the belief that it is an embarrassment forum.337 Unless such 
misconception is dropped, the Democracy Charter would similarly sustain a weak monitoring and 
enforcement mechanism. This, in turn, will confirm the argument that the Charter is designed to 
protect regimes and not to implement democratic values.338 
Nmehielle339 suggests that, NEPAD’s initiative, the APRM340 could serve as a means of ensuring 
compliance to human rights instruments as it implicates areas of governance and the rule of law, 
and perhaps the adverse peer review of states practice could mature into inter-state complaint 
mechanism. Although it is a potential implementation mechanism for the Charter, the fact that it is 
a voluntary accession341 renders its success in securing full cooperation and the enforcement of 
the Charter problematic. However the Charter’s recognition of the importance of the APRM could 
be realised through utmost political will on the part of state parties.342 
 
4.4.2. Election Observation  
 
It is a recognized fact that election observation is a means to enhance democratisation.343 
According to Geisler, observers are likened to a ‘democracy police’ who by their mere presence 
are expected to deter blatant fraud and by their mandate to witness irregularities.344 From time to 
time their presence has become a sine qua non of internationally acceptable elections.345  
The Charter in a vague manner provides that state parties should inform the Commission of 
scheduled elections and to invite it to send an electoral observation mission.346 It further enjoins 
states to guarantee conditions of security, free access to information, non-interference, freedom of 
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movement and full cooperation with election observers.347 While the provision seems to put an 
obligation to inform the Commission, the requirement of sending an invitation erodes the essence 
of the notification reflected in the first limb.348 Given the increased scrutiny that is coming from 
international observers such as the European Union mission, undemocratic regimes such as the 
ones cited in the cases in this paper may skew its interpretation and hence evade the duty of 
having elections observed.  
Apart from the above, once the Commission is informed, it will send an exploratory mission prior to 
the election to ensure that conditions necessary to the holding of free and fair elections are 
established.349 The fact that no time limit is provided is problematic as it will not allow the missions 
to acquaint themselves to all necessary and often contested aspects of the electoral processes350 
such as misuse of government media. It also prevents the proper assessment of protection of 
human rights or the overall political context before the elections.351 Conversely, the SADC 
Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections provide for the deployment of the missions at least two 
weeks prior to voting day though this may not still reveal the overall situation.352 Moreover, the lack 
of a provision on detailed task to be undertaken by the mission under the Charter makes it 
insufficient as opposed to the ECOWAS Protocol.353 
In general, the Commission has a duty to ensure that the missions are independent,354 conducted 
by appropriate and competent experts drawn from continental and national institutions taking due 
cognizance of regional representation and gender equality.355 The missions should also be 
conducted in an objective, impartial and transparent manner.356 The observer mission would 
prepare a report of the activities to the Commission which will be submitted to the state party 
concerned both to be performed within a reasonable time.357 The clause ‘within reasonable time’ 
fails to provide a certain standard unlike the ECOWAS protocol which, at least, fixes a period of 
fifteen days for the mission to submit the report to the executive secretary of the Community.358 
 Save for stating the fact that the report will be submitted to the state concerned, it fails to provide 
for recommendations or measures to be taken by the state on the basis of the findings.359 
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Interestingly, it also does not imply what measures would be taken if the exploratory as well as 
observation missions find violations of the principles of free and fair elections through such as 
fraud, rigging and human rights repressions. However, the Declaration reserves the right of the 
Secretariat (Commission) to refuse the invitation if elections do not measure up to the standards 
within the Declaration.360 
All in all, while the idea of a regionalized election observation is commendable, the Charter is 
substantively deficient in addressing issues like the ones mentioned above. Given the poor 
resource capacity of the Commission itself, undertaking the missions will be difficult unless effort to 
pull sufficient funds is made. Unless a code of Conduct to govern observers is adopted the 
impartiality of the missions would become questionable. To this end, it is suggested that 
institutionalised observation and monitoring in which the collective definition of the rules of 
observation ensures that one is reviewed by peers such through the APRM would offer a 
solution.361  
4.4.3. Effects of Non-compliance 
Non-compliance under the Charter is a subject matter left vaguely described apart from the 
measures to be taken in cases of unconstitutional change of governments within the purview of 
Article 17 of the Charter. Accordingly, the only relevant provision for non-compliance with principles 
of free and fair elections is by implication derived from Article 46 which provides as: 
The AU Assembly and the Peace and Security Council will determine the measures to be taken for non-
compliance with the provisions of the Charter in accordance with the applicable provisions of the AU 
Constitutive Act and the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council.362   
The Constitutive Act provides for sanctions to be imposed in case a state defaults in the payment 
of contributions to the budget of the Union which includes denial of the right to speak at the 
meetings, to vote, to present any candidates for any positions or post within the Union or to benefit 
from any activity or commitments, therefrom.363 Further sanctions for non-compliance include 
denial of transport and communications links with other member states and other measures of 
economic and political nature to be decided by the Assembly.364 The Protocol establishing the PSC 
mandates the Council to institute sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of Government 
takes place as provided for in the Lomé Declaration.365  
It is noted that, the concern and the focus is primarily on unconstitutional change of governments. 
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The fact that specific and detailed provisions on non-compliance have not been provided for is an 
indication of its weak implementation framework to address electoral issues of the continent, or for 
that matter, violations of the democratic principles. There is no explanation why it fails to live up to 
the standards comparable to the ECOWAS Protocol which relatively speaking exhibits specificity. 
The ubiquitous cross reference to other instruments is a sign that the document is not meant to 
serve as a binding and enforceable document. In such situation, one fails to see its distinction from 
earlier efforts. 
 
While democratic behaviour is improving, as Lindberg’s states,366 with the move from violent 
regime changes to the holding of elections, the new face of authoritarianism should be forestalled 
urgently. Austin reminds us that we should also not be deluded by the neatness or the drama of an 
election thinking that it is or it must always be the first or the most important step in the process.367 
The process of democratisation requires the broader understanding of the picture than mere 
elections. Specifically, constitutionalism denotes fidelity to citizens and advancing their needs. 368 
As Shivji noted, ‘…just as setting human rights standards in international instruments does not 
necessarily advance the observance of human rights, setting constitutional norms may not 
advance constitutionalism in Africa.’369 Rather, it may serve to advance and legitimise the struggle 
for human rights and constitutionalism.370 Likewise, the values reflected in the Charter would 
contribute to the consensus on the requirements of holding of free and fair elections. Through 
utmost political will and further efforts on the part of all stakeholders, the principles would find their 
way in national laws and in turn an application.  
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Chapter Five 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Competitive and periodic elections are central to democracy and constitute a critical indicator of 
popular empowerment. However, the history of competitive elections in much of Africa indicates a 
process often marred by pre-and post-electoral crises. Likewise, the recently held elections in 
Ethiopia, Uganda and Nigeria have been plagued with five key problems and hence fell short of the 
requirements of free and fair elections. As a result, they were characterised by the threat or actual 
boycott of elections by opposition parties, violence and intimidation of political opponents, and a 
refusal to accept officially declared results by aggrieved parties, to mention the few.  
     
These confirmed the findings of scholars that African regimes are largely becoming electoral 
authoritarians who illegitimately access power through the ballot box. While there is a correct shift 
towards democratic behaviour, a new face of repression is displayed through the violation of the 
principles of freeness and fairness in democratic elections.  However, much of the African 
response through various commitments focused on the persisting but the diminishing case of 
undemocratic change of governments through coup d’etat.  
 
The impressive outlay of normative standards adopted since the early 1990s paved the way for the 
increased acknowledgment of the essence of free and fair elections in democratisation though they 
fared little in clarifying the requirements as well as in setting a binding standard. Nevertheless, 
what has begun as common aspiration culminated in the adoption of a binding treaty which is the 
new AU Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance restating earlier commitments except 
for its binding nature and universal applicability. 
 
The evaluation of the provisions of the Charter in addressing key electoral problems reveals its 
severe deficiency at substantive as well as application levels. The fact that it fails to make a 
modest attempt to deal with the persisting problems encountered in elections downgrades its 
efficacy as a binding normative standard. The vague and insufficient enforcement mechanism 
makes it a toothless lion. In effect, it raises the question if it adds anything on existing instruments. 
The analysis points out the Charter’s shortcomings but without undermining the values it may 
transpire in advancing and legitimizing the efforts to ensure democratic elections through a binding 
commitment such as itself. 
 
Now that it is waiting for the required number of ratification, measures need to be taken by all 
stakeholders to find ways of filling the chasm and ensure its proper implementation upon its 
enforcement. With this in view, the following recommendations would serve as a pointer of the few 
measures to be taken.  
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Ensuring the universal ratification being the primary task, law and policy reforms should follow in 
achieving consistency with the principles of the Charter. Further efforts should also be made to 
incorporate the principles governing democratic elections reiterated in the OAU/AU Declaration 
with the view to fully enforcing the principles of freeness and fairness. In particular, as the core 
organ behind the implementation of the Charter, the AU Commission should be able to adopt a 
benchmark that would be incorporated in domestic laws. The harmonisation of domestic laws is a 
critical task if uniform application of the benchmarks as well as the Charter is to be achieved.  
 
In this relation, the existence of a set of objective and impartial criteria or norms and standards 
would reduce inconsistencies between domestic observation missions of states and with the 
Commission’s observation missions precluding different conclusions. To this end, the continent 
needs to discuss and adopt these criteria promptly. 
 
In addition, the utility of elections could be enhanced at a national level if only the electoral process 
is accompanied by the building of institutions that foster accountability and greater transparency in 
the governance of the country.The prevailing personality politics could only be checked through 
such mechanisms. Hence, entrenching the independence of national institutions responsible for 
elections namely independent electoral commissions, human rights and anti-corruption 
commissions is a critical step that must be taken by states. Ensuring that they are insulated from 
undue influence and intrusion by political formations competing for power is essential. 
Guaranteeing the establishment and their independence is needed in ensuring democratic 
governance. 
 
The establishment and effective operation of all the above institutions has financial implications. 
Since these are not institutions and mechanisms involved in economically productive activities, 
initiatives to strengthen revenue generation by governments must be prioritised. Sufficient training 
on existing standards and on general human rights standards to personnel in these institutions is 
an essential step. 
 
Civil society organisations(CSOs), including powerful sectors like trade unions and faith-based 
organisations, as well as business communities should be involved in the promotion of the rule of 
law. The democratic function of CSOs lies in their capacity of facilitating political and social 
interaction between state and society. Thus, emboldened CSOs would play a leading role in the 
entrenchment of democratic values at a national as well as continental level. It would also be 
pragmatic to build on existing efforts at sub-regional levels to launch a continent-wide initiative with 
the substantial involvement of all of Africa’s sub-regions.   
 
The continued existence of strong political parties greatly contributes to the political process. To 
this end, parties should be identified with programmes and not along ethnic and alliance of some 
groups to pose as contenders in democratic manner. The persisting repression of democratic 
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forces such as opposition forces should be checked. The need to build trust and cooperation is the 
only solution in ensuring genuine multi-party elections in the continent.  
 
The media should play a role in public education and in spreading democratic values in an 
independent and non-partisan manner. It can be a real watch dog if it effectively empowers the 
public at large enabling it to make a choice of regime or a system. Professionalism could be 
entrenched through capacity building works on the various aspects of the issues.  
 
The AU Commission must be able to overcome the capacity challenges in order to effectively 
engage in standard setting as well as its liaisoning duties. To this end, it must be able to effectively 
engage Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to infuse the commitments at sub-regional 
levels. In particular, the significance of the NEPAD initiative, the APRM, should be promoted in 
drawing more members into the mechanism and in effect in the promotion of democratic principles.  
 
Moreover, the AU should act decisively on the non-recognition of undemocratic governments who 
managed to access power through undemocratic elections; else its renewed commitment to 
democracy would be spurious. The need for promoting reporting under the Charter is another 
crucial task. 
 
Lastly but most importantly, the process of democratization goes beyond the question of simply 
installing a multiparty system. Accordingly, it requires the entrenchment of the rule of law and the 
respect for human rights. The abundant human rights standards should be translated into a reality 
if people should make an effective choice of government. Human rights should be respected at all 
times as it determines the nature of democraticness of elections. Legitimacy of regimes could only 
be ensured if it is accompanied by improvement in the conditions and quality of life of the broad 
masses calling for the fulfilment of their socio-economic rights. Otherwise, elections in Africa would 
increasingly become processes alien to the voters, leaving them only the right to cast their vote 
and in a state of apathy. To this end, utmost political will on the part of states is an essential 
prerequisite if democracy is to be guaranteed through democratic elections in the continent.  
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